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PRIVATE POLICE AND PERSONAL PRIVACY:
WHO'S GUARDING THE GUARDS?
I. INTRODUCTION

Popular perceptions are that the rate of crime in America has
increased over the past several years. 1 As a result, crime has become a

popular issue in contemporary politics. 2 As a further result, communities

have enacted innovative programs in order to ensure the safety of their
1. This perception is shown by the abundance of newspaperarticles referring to the
war on crime. See, e.g., Mike Barnicle, On the Streets, a Human Target, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 15, 1993, at 29; James Bennet, New York Crime Statistics vs. Reality,
N.Y. Ti _s, Aug. 16, 1992, at L39; Marc Cooper, Posse:JoeArpaio 's BoysAre White,
Angry, and Armed. And They're The Law, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 24, 1995, at 30
("'[E]veryone says this is the year that crime is the big issue'" (quoting the Maricopa
County, Arizona Sheriff)); Dick Feagler, No Sympathy Here for Banned Station, THE
PLAIN DEALER, June 10, 1994, at 2A ("Crime is the No. 1 concern of our viewers,"
quoting a TV executive in Florida); Clifford Krauss, New York's Violent Crime Rate
Drops to Lows of Early 1970's, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1995, § 1, at 1 (noting the actual
drop in crime rates "belying commonly held fears of wanton violence"); Sam Roberts,
If it's Tuesday, it Must be Time to Fight Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1991, at B1;
Charles E. Silberman, Any War On Crime Has To Go Deeper Than Talking Tough,
NEWS TRm., Feb. 6, 1994, at F6 ("Many Americans think crime is worse than ever.");
Cal Thomas, A Nation's Soul, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 3, 1994, at 15A. See also U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1992, Table 2.3
(1992) (respondents reporting problems in own neighborhood) (identifying crime as the
worst neighborhood problem in 1990); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1994, Table 2.31 (1993) (54% of respondents believe
that crime has increased in their own area). In fact, the perception is ungrounded. See
Krauss, supra (noting the drop in crime rates to a new twenty-year low).
2. See, e.g., Ted Gest, Congress and Cops, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 26,
1994, at 31; David G. Savage & Ronald J. Ostrow, GOP to Seek New, StrongerAnticrime Bill, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1994, at A29; Richard Wolf, GOP Wants to Lock in
TougherJail Sentences, USA TODAY, Feb. 10, 1995, at 4A; Richard Wolf, Republicans
Bite into Crime Bill, USA TODAY, Feb. 9, 1995, at 8A.
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residents.' One method that both urban and suburban communities
4 alike
have employed is the use of private security officers and patrols.

Private law enforcement officials' are not subject to the same rules
controlling the behavior of the official police.'

The procedural

protections contained in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights limit only
the actions of the government, and not the actions of private individuals. 7
The absence of a legal framework of procedural protection from private

law enforcement officials is particularly distressing in view of their
3. Gated communities are an example: see, e.g., Gardner P. Dunnan, Is Safety a
Question of Class and Caste?, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1994, at C13; Eugene Weber,
Parkingin FortressLos Angeles Bares the Angelino Psyche, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 9, 1989,
at L22. Curfews are another: see, e.g., Richard Weizel, Street Violence and Teen-Age
Curfews, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1994, § 14, at 1; and so are neighborhood watch
programs: see, e.g., Carol Chastang, Not YourAverage Joe; a Community Activist Takes
His War on Crime and Blight to the Street, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1994, at J12; Juliet
Eilperin, Hill Residents Fight War on Crime But Police Say the Battle Still Rages, ROLL
CALL, Nov. 17, 1994 at 32; Otis White, The Best-run Town in Florida, FLA. TREND,
Feb. 1995, at 36.
4. See, e.g., John Devine, Class, Race, Security, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1995, § 13,
at 11 ("The [private] security force [in schools] is going to get bigger and bigger ...
[The force is now] 3000 plus and growing, which is slightly less than the entire police
force in Boston."); Bruce Lambert, A Fierce Debate Raging Over Plansfor Security
Force, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1994, § 13, at 5 (reporting plan by New York City
community to employ a 500-person private security force to patrol its neighborhood);
Bruce Lambert, A District That Wasn't: No Private Police Force Here, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 1995, § 13, at 6 (noting the death of the plan for over 500 private security
guards on New York City's upper east side in part due to the lack of accountability the
public would experience with the private officers); Clare Collins, Hiring PrivateSecurity
Guards to Cut Neighborhood Crime, N.Y. TIME, Aug. 8, 1994, at C6; Thomas J.
Lueck, Public Needs, Private Answers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1994, at BI; Kathy
Scruggs, Private CopsLikely in Downtown Area, ATLANTA J. & CoNsT., Feb. 4, 1995,
at C-2; Susan Steinberg, Westside Cover Story: Crime Takes a Fall, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
21, 1995, at J10.
5. The terms "private law enforcement official," "private security officer," and
"institutional private party" are used interchangeably throughout this Note and include
any individual or organization involved with law enforcement or security, but lacking
official police authority.
6. See infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment applies only to actions of the government). See also United States v.
Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1964); People v. Tarantino, 290 P.2d 505 (Cal. 1955);
People v. Fierro, 46 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1965).
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growing role in the nation's law enforcement and security industry. 8
Searches which could not otherwise be performed by the police can be
performed by private law enforcement officials: any evidence seized
pursuant to such a search is admissible in court.9 The situation violates
the spirit of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees that citizens shall
be free from unreasonable invasions of their right to privacy.' Allowing
courts to use evidence seized in this manner amounts to a constructive"
violation of a person's Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the same
exclusionary practices should apply to all searches no matter the character

of the searcher: as one court has said, "[tjhe result in each case is the
same-invasion of the [individual's privacy]."12
However, broadening the scope of the exclusionary rule based strictly
on a more generous interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is difficult to
imagine. The rule that the Fourth Amendment applies only to state action
is well-settled. Nonetheless, the problem continues and personal privacy
is threatened. At least one court has explicitly recognized this and applied
constitutional limitations to private searchers. 3 However, that court was
overruled five years later." That overruling is consistent with the vast
8. See John M. Burkoff, Not So PrivateSearchesand the Constitution, 66 CORNELL
L. REV. 627, 646 n.95 (1981) (discussing the vast and rapidly growing role of private
security and law enforcement in our society). See also GEORGE O'TOOLE, THE PRIVATE
SECTOR: PRIVATE SPIES, RENT-A-COPS, AND THM POLICE-INDUSTRIAL COMLEX at xixv (1978).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 613 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1980) (allowing
evidence seized by United Parcel Service); United States v. Reed, 810 F. Supp. 1078
(Alaska 1992) (allowing evidence seized in a private search with peripheral involvement
by police); United States v. Pollack, 414 F. Supp. 203 (D.C. 1976) (allowing evidence
seized in private search); People v. Crank, 590 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1992) (direction by or
cooperation with the police necessary to make search attributable to the state); Cullom
v. State, 673 P.2d 904 (Alaska 1983) (holding that search by store security guard was
not state action). But see People v. Zelinski, 594 P.2d 1000 (Cal. 1979) (applying
constitutional limitations to store security guard where the guard asserted the power of
the state to arrest and detain a shoplifter).
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also SALTZBURG & CAPRA, AMERICAN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 1992) ("mhe Amendment plainly recognizes a right..
. . The cases [can] suggest that the Amendment protects privacy. To some extent this
must be true."). Id. at 26.
11. "That which has not the character assigned to it in its own essential nature,
but acquires such character [as a] consequence in the way in which it is [construed]."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 164 (5th ed. abr. 1983).
12. State v. Hyem, 630 P.2d 202, 206 (Mont. 1981), overruled by State v. Long,
700 P.2d 153 (Mont. 1985).
13. Hyem, 630 P.2d at 202.
14. Long, 700 P.2d at 153.
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Therefore, short of a major

shift in judicial interpretation of the Constitution, the best way to protect
privacy is to amend the rules of criminal procedure to bar the use in court
of evidence seized unlawfully,' 5 regardless of the character of the
searcher. As this Note will illustrate, support for doing so can be found
in various areas of the law.
As background, Part II of this Note examines the pervasive role of
private law enforcement in modem society. 6 Next, Part III traces the

history of the Fourth Amendment, identifies the principles behind it, and
demonstrates how those principles are held inviolate by use of the

exclusionary rule.' 1 Part IV then discusses four arguments that support
extending the scope of the exclusionary rule to unlawful searches by
private parties: the history and spirit of the Fourth Amendment; analogy
to precedent; the imperative of judicial integrity; and the public function
doctrine." Finally, Part V ties the arguments together, and suggests that
the best possible means to prevent these private searches and provide a
remedy when they do occur is by extending current exclusionary
practices. 9
II. THE ROLE OF PRIVATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND SECURITY
The increase in institutional private law enforcement is arguably a
result of a growing perception that municipal police forces are less able
than in the past to deal with the growing rate of crime.' In 1992, 30%
of the national population believed that the police were only coping
15. As used throughout this note, this term and "illegally" mean without proper
consent.
16. See infra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 29-84 and accompanying text. The extensive treatment of the
Fourth Amendment is central to understanding its pivotal role throughout history and
supporting the argument for extending exclusionary principles. Cf. Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1946) (explaining the appropriateness of an in-depth review of the
history of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment for the Court to render its
decision).
18. See infra notes 85-173 and accompanying text. These sections present the clear
need for extending the exclusionary rule to unlawful searches by private institutional
searchers. Although comparison with individual private searches is occasionally used for
the sake of clarity, individual private searches are not the focus of this Note.
19. See infra notes 174-92 and accompanying text.
20. See O'TooLE, supra note 8; LEO F. HANNON, THE LEGAL SIDE OF PRIVATE
SECURITY, at xi-xii (1992).
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"fairly" with crime.2" Crime consistently ranked high among the most
important problems facing the country. A result of this is a feeling of
helplessness, and consequently the role of private law enforcement in our
society has been expanding steadily.'
The presence of private law enforcement is now vast.' The private
security industry affects every aspect of society.' Private security is
present in urban and suburban law enforcement, sometimes outnumbering
police personnel. 5 Its pervasive role is a vital part of the creation and
maintenance of a safe environment in which to work and live.' And the
effects of private security growth are visible: for example, in
neighborhoods and communities across the country, there are signs
alerting intruders of the presence of private security forces that patrol the
areaY The private law enforcement industry is formidable and continues

to grow at a rate of 10-15% per year.'

It is the relationship between

this industry and the citizens it protects that this Note examines in
particular.
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment ensures "[tihe right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
21. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOKOF CnIMINALJUSTICESTATISTICS-1992,
Table 2.14 (1992) (respondents' ratings of local police solving crime); U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOKOF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATIsTICS-1994, Table 2.11 (1995) (30%
of respondents' reported "some" confidence in the police while 10% reported having
"very little").
22. See O'TOOLE, supra note 8, at xi-xv. See also Douglas Frantz, A Midlife Crisis
at Kroll Associates, N.Y. TImS, Sept. 1, 1994, at D1, 5 (reporting on success of a
leading private investigative firm in the private security industry).
23. Burkoff, supra note 8, at 646 n.95.
24. Id.
25. For example, in 1986, General Motors employed 4200 private security officers,
a force larger than all but five municipal police forces in America at that time. See
O'TOOLE, supra note 8, at xii; see also Devine, supra note 4 (noting New York City's
private security force for schools is nearly the size of Boston's regular police
department).
26. See id.
27. See supra note 3.
28. O'TOoLE, supra note 8, at xii.
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and seizures . ... "29 Its history is important to the analysis that
follows.
In the years preceding the American Revolution, writs of assistance,

which authorized arbitrary searches and seizures and required no
description of the nature of the search or the property sought therefrom,
were commonly issued.' Typically, these writs authorized searches of
cellars, warehouses, ships, and persons for the purpose of finding illegal
goods (contraband), or goods for which no customs or duties had been
paid.3" Writs of assistance issued from local courts within the Colonies,

and all attempts to invalidate them were consistently rejected as contrary
to the Act of William I. 32 In February 1761, James Otis, Jr., a leading

voice of revolutionary debate, argued at a hearing that was to determine

the validity of writs granted by state courts.33 He attacked not only the
validity of the writs themselves, but also the entire policy of England
towards the Colonies.'
This was one of the first notable movements

towards revolution.'

In the words of John Adams, "then and there the

brat Independence was born."I Challenges to the writs persisted, and

the cry to ensure the individual right of privacy sprang to the forefront of
pre-revolutionary debate and dissension.3 7
In the post-revolutionary days during the drafting of the Constitution,
concern over writs of assistance and the larger issue of individual privacy

29. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
30. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEvELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51-78 (1937) (detailing the history
of writs of assistance in the Colonies). A writ of assistance was traditionally issued by
a court of equity in aid of the execution of a judgment at law, which transfers the
possession of lands to a particular complainant including, as the case may be, the state.
See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1784 (4th ed. 1968).
31. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886) (discussing the purposes of
writs of assistance).
32. Nevertheless, the writs apparently were illegal under a strict interpretation of
the Act of William III. The Act specifically authorized the writs to issue from the Court
of Exchequer in England. However, no such entity existed in the Colonies to properly
issue the writs, and the Court of Exchequer's power did not extend that far. See
LASSON, supra note 30, at 61-62.
33. LASSON, supra note 30, at 57, 58. See id. at 56-63 for an extensive treatment
of the Writs of Assistance Case.
34. Id. at 58.
35. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625.
36. Id. See also LASSON, supra note 30, at 59.
37. See LASSON, supra note 30, at 58-60.
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did not fade.3" Protection from government invasion of privacy was
consistently debated during the Constitutional Convention.3 9 A division
developed between those who wanted a bill of rights that would protect
certain enumerated fundamental rights (including the right to privacy) and
those who felt that a bill of rights was unnecessary.' Advocates of a bill
of rights noted that in the past decade most states had drafted and adopted
a bill of rights for their constitutions. Such advocates felt that itemization
of certain inviolable individual rights and liberties was absolutely crucial
and particularly appropriate in organizing a new central government.41
Those opposed to a bill of rights were not against the notion of securing
individual rights and liberties per se, but withheld their approval for more
fundamental reasons.42 First, they feared the implications of espressio
unius est excluslo alterius.
They did not want to risk having an
itemized list of protected individual rights and then be foreclosed from
adding to that list in the future." Second, and more fundamental,
objectors felt that the inclusion of a bill of rights was simply unnecessary
under the theory of delegated and reserved powers upon which the
Constitution was to be based.' Individual rights were to be secured by
the people's relationship with their state governments since either the state
governments or the people were left with all powers and authority not
specifically divested to the new federal government.' Where state bills
38. See 1 THE COiPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 64-70 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)

(outlining the push by colonists for an amendment to insure against future invasions of
privacy).
39. See id.
40. Id. at 65. See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1913) (describing at length divisions between Federalists and AntiFederalists during the Convention).
41. Storing, supra note 38, at 2:6-8 (citing a letter from Elbridge Gerry, delegate
to the Constitutional Convention, listing among his objections to the draft of the
Constitution "that the system is without the security of a bill of rights").
42. LASSON, supra note 30, at 79-105.
43. Literally, "the expression of one is the exclusion of another." Under this
maxim of statutory construction, the expression of certain rights will exclude the
existence of others. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
44. LASSON, supra note 30, at 90.
45. Id. at 91; 1 Storing, supra note 38, at 65. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84
(Alexander Hamilton) (presenting structural arguments against a Federal bill of rights).
46. LASSON, supranote 30, at 99 (quoting James Madison). See also U.S. CONST.
amend. IX.
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of rights already existed to protect individual rights, 47 opponents of a
Federal bill of rights felt that such an addition to the Constitution would
be "superfluous and absurd."'

The debate at the Constitutional Convention ended with a political
compromise among the participants to adopt a bill of rights after
ratification of the Constitution.4 9 While concern over protection of
individual rights and liberties did not stop ratification of the Constitution,

it is significant to this Note that the individual right to privacy in one's
home was central in the debate over a bill of rights.' This debate
demonstrated a backlash against the days of arbitrary invasions of privacy

under the dubious authority of general writs of assistance.51 Since then,
the guarantee of a right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment has
become one of the great pillars of individual liberty,5" at tension with the
power of the government to provide for the safety and welfare of the

people. 3

The Fourth Amendment "was adopted in view of long misuse of
power in ... searches and seizures both in England and the colonies; and
the assurance against any revival of it. . .. "' Its principles embody the
belief that arbitrary and capricious governmental power is to be guarded

against by expressly ensuring that specific fundamental rights may not be
infringed upon in the absence of certain procedural protections.-

47. See LASSON, supra note 30, at 80-82 (citing examples of early declarations of
rights by the States).
48. Storing, supra note 38, at 65-66 (quoting James Wilson's state-house speech
delivered October 4, 1787).
49. LASSON, supra note 30, at 94-95. See HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTIFEDERALISTS WERE FOR (1981) (detailing the formation of the bill of rights).
50. Indeed, it was of such concern that it prevented two states (North Carolina and
Rhode Island) from ratifying the Constitution in a timely manner. LASSON, supranote
30, at 104. See STORING, supra note 49, at 3.
51. See Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927).
52. See generally Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-30 (1886) (tracing
through history the importance of the individual right to privacy secured by the Fourth
Amendment).
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
54. Byars, 273 U.S. at 33.
55. The idea was well put by William Pitt:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all of the forces of
the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through
it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may not
enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.
LASSON, supra note 30, at 49-50 (citations omitted).
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B. The Exclusionary Rule
1. Development
Although the history of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment points
to a clear restriction on government authority, the Amendment itself fails
to address directly the use of any evidence seized in violation of its
principle.56 In fact, the issue was never even addressed by the United
States Supreme Court until nearly 100 years after the Bill of Rights was
adopted.5"
In the first case, Boyd v. United States,58 the Court
answered in the affirmative the question of whether relevant but illegally
seized evidence must be excluded from use in court.59 Unable to see any
significant distinction between seizing a person's property to be used as
evidence against him and compelling that person to be a witness against
himself, the Court concluded that evidence illegally seized by the
government is inadmissible in actions against its owner.' Thus, based
on a combination of Fourth and Fifth Amendment principles, the
exclusionary rule was created.61
Initially, the exclusionary rule applied only to unlawful searches by
federal agents in federal proceedings' but left untouched situations where
state agents supplied illegally seized evidence in federal proceedings and
where state agents supplied illegally seized evidence in state
proceedings.'
Its scope was extended to cover unlawful searches by
state agents in federal proceedings in Elkins v. United States," which
ended the "silver platter" doctrine. Finally, in Mapp v. Ohio,' the
Court, which relied on the Fourteenth Amendment, applied the rule to
searches by state agents in state proceedings.' This effectively closed
56. See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
57. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 636-37.
60. Id. at 630-31.
61. Id.
62. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-93 (1914).
63. This was called the 'silver platter' doctrine. The phrase was taken from Lustig
v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949). It meant that law enforcement authorities
could satisfy their goals by using evidence unlawfully seized by another group of
authorities. Those authorities were said to have given the evidence to the federal
authorities on a 'silver platter' for use in their judicial proceeding.
64. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
65. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
66. Id. at 670-71.
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the remaining loophole in Fourth Amendment protection that was of
significant concern at the time. 7
2. Policy and Principle
By ensuring that the Federal and state governments will not benefit
from evidence seized in violation of an individual's right to privacy, the
exclusionary rule removes the incentive to conduct illegal searches."' If
law enforcement agents know that illegally seized evidence cannot be used
to convict a defendant, they will be less likely to invade a citizen's
privacy.'
The exclusionary rule seeks to strike a balance between
preserving the individual's interest in privacy and facilitating the
government's interest in detecting and punishing crime.7' Nowhere is
this balance seen more clearly than with the "good-faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule. In United States v. Leon,7 the Supreme Court
modified the exclusionary rule to allow use of evidence seized q
government agents in reasonable reliance on a validly issued warrant.
The Court found that, in this specific type of situation, excluding the
evidence in question did not serve any of the policy goals of the Fourth
Amendment.73
Dissenting in Burdeau v. McDowell, Justices Brandeis and Holmes
reminded us that the government is subject to the laws of this nation as is
any citizen and that "[a]t the foundation of our civil liberty lies the
principle which denies to government officials an exceptional position
before the law and which subjects them to the same rules of conduct that
67. The role of private law enforcement at the time of Mapp was not as extensive
as it is now. See O'TooLE, supra note 8. See generally Paul G. Reiter, Annotation,
Admissibility, in Criminal Cases, ofEvidence Obtained by Search by Private Individual,
36 A.L.R.3d 553 (1971) (discussing the origins, development and application of the
exclusionary rule).
68. John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. RaV. 1027,
1030 (1974). See also Connell L. Archey, The Status of Private Searches Under the
Louisiana Constitutionof 1974, 49 LA. L. REv. 873, 890-901 (1989) (discussing in detail
the policy behind the exclusionary rule in the context of private searches).
69. See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text. See also Archey, supranote 68,
at 893-96.
70. See Kaplan, supra note 68, at 1030.
71. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
72. Id. at 908-13.
73. Id. at 916-17. The policy goals the Court recognized were deterring future
police misconduct, punishing current non-compliance with the law, and deterring judicial
misconduct.
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are commands to the citizen."' This principle lays the foundation for
the notion that government should not benefit (i.e., secure criminal
convictions) from unlawful activities (i.e., illegal private searches). 5
3. Application
The exclusionary rule's effectiveness depends on fulfilling two
requirements.76 First, the agents performing the search must be
motivated by securing convictions.'
This interest will force them to
search lawfully so that they may use any seized evidence in court.7 8
Second, the particular agents performing the search must engage in
searches regularly. 79 This regularity ensures that they will have
knowledge of the exclusionary rule and, therefore, abide by its restrictive
framework.'
Satisfying these two requirements ought at least to
minimize the frequency of, and at best avoid, unlawful searches and
seizures.
However, because the exclusionary rule applies only to state action,81
its goal of protecting individual privacy is not being met.' A rapidly
growing private law enforcement industry is becoming more and more
involved in ensuring public safety. It has lead to a variant silver platter
situation where the evidence is handed over for prosecutorial purposes.'
To close this loophole, the scope of the exclusionary rule ought to be
broadened to bar the use in court of evidence seized unlawfully by any
party-public or private."

74. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476-77 (1921) (Brandeis, J. and Holmes,
J., dissenting).
75. See infra note 133.
76. Harvey L. Ziff, Seizures by Private Parties: Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19
STAN. L. REV. 608, 614-15 (1967).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 615.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
82. See generally O'TOOLE, supra note 8 (discussing in detail the extent to which
individual privacy is invaded by the vast private law enforcement industry).
83. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 87-192 and accompanying text.
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IV. EXTENDING THE PRINCIPLE OF EXCLUSION

There is an inherent conflict between the policy goals of the
exclusionary rule and other governmental goals in the context of private
searches. In direct tension with the government's interest in the traditional
goals of law enforcement (i.e., reducing crime and apprehending
criminals) is the government and the people's interest in preserving an
individual's privacy.'
While a perfect balance between the two is
difficult to achieve, the interest in securing privacy is arguably more
compelling than the interest in providing law enforcement agents with
another potentially overbearing enforcement tactic.86 The arguments that
follow: spirit of the Fourth Amendment, analogy to precedent, judicial
integrity, and the public function doctrine, taken together show the need
and the support for extending the scope of the exclusionary rule to bar
admission in court of evidence seized unlawfully by private law
enforcement officers.
A. History and Spirit of the Fourth Amendment
Examining the spirit and history of the text of the Fourth Amendment
yields support for extending the scope of the exclusionary rule to unlawful
private searches. This analysis of the Fourth Amendment takes us past the
formalistic bar to excluding fruits of illegal private searches simply
because they are not the result of state action. "
The Fourth Amendment creates a right to privacy for all citizens and
safeguards them from unreasonable searches and seizures by the
government.88 While the Framers of the Amendment were concerned
specifically with searches and seizures performed directly by the
government, the Amendment could legitimately be regarded more broadly
85. See Archey, supra note 68, at 893.
86. Fundamental rights and liberties frequently dominate in importance over police
powers and other interests of the government. See infra notes 150-57 and accompanying
text.
87. See infra notes 108-25 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 147-52.
88. United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 153 & n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that
the Fourth Amendment protects a right of privacy which is the core protection from
overbearing government officials); Hall v. Garson 430 F.2d 430, 438 (5th Cir. 1970)
(identifying the right to privacy as one of the most personal of rights). But see Burdeau
v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (holding that Fourth Amendment does not protect
citizens from actions by other citizens even if the seized items are eventually turned over
to the government); see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Archey, supra
note 68, at 893-94 (discussing the right to privacy conferred by the Fourth Amendment);
SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 10.
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as having created a general realm of privacy to which each citizen is
entitled. 9 In other words, the Fourth Amendment could be viewed in a
positive manner-as an affirmative grant of privacy rights to
individuals-' rather than solely as a limiting doctrine on governmental
powers. 91
While traditionally the Amendment has been interpreted as a limiting
doctrine, by virtue of those very limitations it has made a de facto grant
of privacy rights. 2 The courts have left a certain portion of the realm
of individual privacy inviolable except under very limited
circumstances.'
This sacred area is the realm of individual privacy:
arguably citizens have an interest in preserving it from invasion,
It is a common
expecially whereby they are held criminally liable.'
understanding that when the government breaches this realm of privacy by
using unlawfuly seized evidence in court, there is an invasion of
individual rights and, thus, a violation of the letter and spirit of the Fourth
Amendment.95 By analogy, even when a private searcher breaches the
walls of privacy the harm is no less severe and privacy is diminished
nonetheless.
89. M.E. BRADFORD, ORIGINAL INTENTIONS (1993), at xii (explaining the

teleocratic approach to constitutional interpretation). Under this approach, the
Constitution was conceived, written and adopted to create a particular type of society
based upon principles of individual liberty, justice, and equality.
90. See id.
91. Id. at xi. Bradford also explains the nomocratic view of the Constitution.
Under this approach, the Constitution is a limiting doctrine meant only to bring the newly
created government within the bounds of the law, and no more.
92. Archey, supra note 68, at 894 ("[A]Ithough the fourth amendment may be
concerned only with governmental intrusions, it clearly serves the purpose of securing
an inviolable 'zone of privacy' for the individual."). See also BRADFORD, supra note
89, at xii.
93. See Archey, supra note 68, at 894; BRADFORD, supranote 89, at xii. The face
of the Amendment supports this: it recognizes the government's power to search and
seize property but that very power is constrained by the requirement of reasonableness
and probable cause. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Thus, an unreasonable search
necessarilyinvades the right to privacy as does a search conducted pursuant to a warrant
issued without probable cause, barring certain explicit exceptions such as good faith
reliance on an invalid warrant. See, e.g., U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)
(establishing the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule).
94. See Archey, supra note 68, at 894; BRADFORD, supra note 89, at xii.
95. See infra notes 126-73 and accompanying text.
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The history of the text of the Fourth Amendment also supports the
concept of a realm of privacy.' Notably, the Amendment is not in the
form originally approved by the House of Representatives.' The text of
the Amendment originally read, in relevant part: "[t]he right of the people
to be secured [sic] in their persons ... shall not be violated by warrants
issuing without probable cause . . . . "" This text, approved by the
House, served only to limit the issuance of warrants to cases where
probable cause existed' and established no broader right to privacy. The
text was revised by Egbert Benson, Chairman of the Committee of Three,
appointed to arrange the formal, ordered amendments which would
comprise the Bill of Rights."m° Despite the fact that the House never
actually approved of his changes, the revision created the amendment as
it has stood for over two hundred years.' 0' That text reads (in reverse
order for emphasis), "no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause
supported by Oath or affirmation. . ." and that "[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated . . . ,,'1
Not only does it limit the
issuance of warrants, but arguably, it creates a broader right as well."(3
Parsing the text like this shows more clearly the establishment of a general
right to privacy which is the underpinning of the Fourth Amendment.
Where a private search contains the substance and essence of a
government search and effects its substantial purpose," °4 the safeguards
of the Fourth Amendment should bar the use in court of the fruits of an
unlawful private search. Indeed, it is likely that, given current conditions,
the Framers would agree to extend the rule.
Arguments emphasizing
96. Interpreting the Fourth Amendment in a teleocratic rather than nomocratic
manner was popular at one time too. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1886) ("iflt is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that
constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property .....
97. LASSON, supra note 30, at 101-02.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. In fact, the House of Representatives even voted against Benson's changes
when he originally submitted them during the Constitutional Convention. Id.
102. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
103. See BRADFORD, supra note 89, 114.
104. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635.
105. "The struggle against arbitrary power in which [the Framers] had been engaged
for more than 20 years would have been too deeply engraved in their memories to have
allowed them to approve of such insidious disguises of the old grievance which they had
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form over substance ought not to prevail where fundamental rights are
concerned."°6 The privacy principle of the Fourth Amendment, illustrated
by its history and its text, supports extending exclusionary practices to bar
the use in court of evidence seized unlawfully by private law enforcement
agents.
B. Analogy to Precedent
Support for extending the reach of the exclusionary rule is found in,
and by drawing an analogy to, a principle identified and discussed in
several Supreme Court cases."°
Circumvention of privacy safeguards was condemned by the Supreme
Court in Elkins v. United States"8 and Rea v. United States."° Elkins
ended "silver platter" situations where evidence from illegal state searches
was admitted in federal proceedings, even if that evidence was seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment."'
The Court attacked the
incongruity in exclusionary practices that admitted evidence unlawfully
seized by state officials that would be barred were it obtained through
similar unlawful practices by federal officials."' While it is arguable
that the incongruity was more obvious in Elkins, where state action was
involved, than in private search cases, the Court in Elkins established
some broad principles which are nevertheless relevant to the private search
issue.' 2
Justice Stewart began his analysis of exclusionary practices by taking
a historical perspective." 3 He returned to the principles set out nearly
fifty years ago in Weeks v. United States," 4 and noted that "the effect
of the [Fourth] Amendment is to put the courts of the United States...
in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and
restraints . . . . [Unlawful law enforcement practices] should find no
so deeply abhorred." Id. at 635.
106. See People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13 (1926) (Cardozo, C.J.) ("We exalt form
over substance when we hold that the use is made lawful becuase the intruder is without
a badge of office.").
107. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Rea v. United States,
350 U.S. 214 (1955). See also People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13 (1926) (Cardozo, C.J.).
108. 364 U.S. 206.
109. 350 U.S. 214.
110. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223-24.
111. Id. at 215.
112. See id. at 215-17.
113. Id. at 208.
114. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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sanction in the judgments of the courts . . . . -.
" He emphasized that
"[tio the victim [of an unlawful search] it matters not whether his
constitutional right has been invaded by a federal agent or by a state
officer."" 6 This analysis easily applies to private search scenarios. To
the searched party, the result of a court using unlawfully seized evidence
against him is the same regardless of the character of the party who seized
the evidence: federal, state, or private.' 17 The evidence seized in each
situation is used to convict a person of criminal activity. The individual's
privacy is invaded in one of the worst ways possible: the individual is
subjected to criminal liability or other adverse actions.11
Rea v. United States" 9 dealt with a situation similar to that in
Elkins. The Court held that evidence unlawfully seized by a federal agent
was inadmissible in a state court proceeding.' 2 The Court concluded
that the policy of protecting the privacy of a particular citizen would be
defeated if the fruits of an unlawful search by a government agent are used
in a judicial proceeding against that citizen.'
This broad principle is equally applicable to the private search
scenario and, if applied, could block the end-runs around the Fourth
Amendment that private police are getting away with. The exclusionary
rule rests on the notion that if the fruits of an unlawful search of a citizen
are used against that person, the promises of (i) privacy guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment, and (ii) to be free from self-incrimination as
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, are empty. 12 We see this by
focusing on the effect of the search, which makes it clear that privacy
rights are violated when a court uses unlawfully seized evidence against
an individual."
115. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 209 (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 391-92).
Id. at 215.
See id.
Id.
350 U.S. 214 (1955).
Id. at 217-18.
121. Id. at 218.
122. Cf. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1919)
(Holmes, J.) (stating that where the government wants to use evidence admittedly seized
unlawfully "reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words." (citation omitted)); see
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1886).
123. Note that in both Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223-24, and Rea, 350 U.S. at 218, the
Court focused on the character of the party performing the search. See also People v.
Defore, 242 N.Y. 13 (1926) (Cardozo, C.J.) (noting that the nature of the privacy
invasion should be emphasized, not the character of the searcher).
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

1995]

NOTE: WHO'S GUARDING T=E GUARDS

The similarity between the harms in the state-action scenario and the
private search scenario supports an extension of the principle of Weeks,
E-ins, and Rea."2 The harm inflicted on the person is equal regardless
of the character of the searcher. Although the Supreme Court has
steadfastly held that the Fourth Amendment applies only to actions of the
government, 125 nevertheless rooted in this precedent is a principle which
lends strong support to extending the scope of the exclusionary rule to
unlawful private searches.
C. The Argument for JudicialIntegrity
The policy of maintaining judicial integrity favors extending the scope
of the exclusionary rule to unlawful private searches." 2 This policy
distances courts from individual conduct that would taint the integrity of
the courts.12 Current exclusionary practices do in effect maintain some
judicial integrity in that they do not allow courts to be a party to illegal
activities of official law enforcement authorities conducting unlawful
searches." Otherwise, the integrity of the courts would be jeopardized
when they used evidence adversely against a person which was seized in
contravention of the law. Likewise, the use of evidence unlawfully seized
by private parties makes the court, in a sense, a party to the harm caused
by the invasion of privacy that has occurred. The imperative of judicial
integrity and the risk of derogating it, demands correcting this situation
and strongly supports extending the exclusionary rule to unlawful private
searches.
124. See People v. Eastway, 241 N.W.2d 249, 250 (Mich. 1976) (asserting that
there is "ample authority for the proposition that the exclusionary rule does and should
apply to evidence discovered as the result of an unreasonable search and seizure
conducted by private security guards.").
125. United States v. Goldberg, 330 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1964) (reaffirming that the
holding in Burdeau limiting application of the Fourth Amendment to state agents was
unimpaired by the holdings in both Elkins and Rea), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
126. Archey, supra note 68, at 896-97.
127. Id.
128. The exclusionary rule works to heed the admonition of Justice Brandeis:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it
fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself;
it invites anarchy.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Judicial integrity requires creating a balance between the courts'
rights-protecting function and their fact-finding function.129 By allowing
use of evidence seized illegally by a private party, courts enhance their
fact-finding capabilities but also infringe on a right that they are supposed
to protect. In effect, they sanction invasions of privacy by creating the
incentive of obtaining criminal prosecution." 3 As a result, their rightsprotecting function is degraded because they are participating in violating
individual privacy. Although the courts' role as a fact-finding institution
31
is critical to the effective implementation of law enforcement policy,
preserving individual rights ought to weigh more heavily than simply
making available to the courts another avenue of obtaining competent
evidence concerning a case. 32
For the imperative of judicial integrity to be most forceful and
effective, one must consider the violation of privacy to be more than a
one-time occurrence where the harm is inflicted only at the time of the
actual physical invasion, i.e. the search.'33 In fact, the damage from the
invasion continues and becomes worse when the courts use the unlawfully
seized evidence at trial against the invaded party." Viewing a violation
of privacy in this manner dispenses with the formalistic criticism that the
courts are not an actual and direct party to the violation of privacy. 13
Thus, whether or not the government is present at the actual time of the
unlawful search is not a necessary factor in considering judicial integrity.
The fact that they utilize the fruits of the unlawful search compounds the
harm inflicted on the victim of the search.' 36 As Justice Black stated,
under differing circumstances, "[in] our constitutional system, courts stand
against any winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who might
129. Archey, supra note 68, at 896-97.
130. See generally id. (discussing the exclusionary rule and the reasons for its
development); Burkoff, supra note 8 (same); Reiter, supra note 67 (same).
131. See generally Archey, supra note 68; Reiter, supra note 67.
132. See supra note 86; infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
133. C. U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 935 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(asserting that interpreting the Fourth Amendment as to apply only to the actual search
procedure is a "crabbed reading").
134. See id. at 934-35.
135. See id. at 937-38.
136. Cf. id. (asserting that when a government agent violates individual privacy by
unlawfully seizing evidence, the courts participate in the violation by using the evidence
against that individual in a criminal proceeding).
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They are not supposed to be a governmental
"..."137
otherwise suffer .
rights. This promise can be fulfilled
individual
institution that oppresses
only by preserving the integrity of the courts which, in turn, can be done
by extending the scope of the exclusionary rule to private searches.
Variations in the theme of judicial integrity have surfaced in Supreme
Court cases that reinforce extending the scope of the exclusionary
rule.138 In the landmark case of Shelley v. Kraemer,39 the Supreme
Court held that enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant in a deed to
real property by a state court constituted sufficient state action to violate
the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 4 Although
the holding in Shelley was reached through a state-action analysis, the
conclusion was based ultimately on the related doctrine of judicial
If the lower court enforced the restrictive covenant, it
integrity."
would have become a party to the discrimination-an intolerable result that
would have sacrificed that court's integrity.142 By analogy, courts' use
of evidence seized in an unlawful search by a private law enforcement
officer creates sufficient government participation to detract from the
integrity of the courts and to warrant application of the exclusionary
rule. 143
137. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940) (Black, J.) (holding that use
of coerced confessions violates the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan,
Douglas & Marshall, J.J., dissenting) (uppermost in the minds of the Framers were "the
twin goals of enabling the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official
lawlessness and of assuring the people ...that the government would not profit from
its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in
government."); Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968) (stating "[e]ourts ...will not be
made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens ....); Lombard
v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 278-280 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) (elaborating on
the holding in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)); see also United States v. Mount,
757 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, C.J., concurring) (identifying the purposes of
the exclusionary rule as deterrence and judicial integrity); United States v. Main, 598
F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1979) (discussing the role of judicial integrity in exclusionary
practices); Honeycutt v. Aetna Insurance Co., 510 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1975) (discussing
the role ofjudicial integrity in the exclusionary rule). But see United States v. Turk, 526
F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1976) (criticizing the imperative of judicial integrity as being a goal
of exclusionary rule given only lip-service in the past).
139. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
140. Id. at 20-23.
141. Id. at 18-19.
142. Id.; see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 897 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
143. See Ziff, supra note 76, at 614-15. See also Leon, 468 U.S. at 937-38
(Brennan, J.dissenting).
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There are many parallels in the facts and principles between Shelley
and those at issue in the typical search by a private law enforcement
officer. As in Shelley, where the state participation came in the form of
the court enforcing the restrictive covenant, the participation of the state
in the private search situation consists of the court's use of the illegally
seized evidence against the defendant.' " Furthermore, just as the
restrictive covenant in Shelley was not itself violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a private search is not itself violative of the Fourth

Amendment. 45 In both instances, the violation occurs when the courts
enter the picture and enforce adverse judgments against individuals. 146
Furthermore, it is well-settled that certain actions of the judiciary can
be considered state action.147 Indeed, there are many instances where

judicial action has been barred because it is state action and held violative

of the law.1 "
For example, the courts cannot impose a racial
qualification on prospective jurors. 49 Nor can they impose penalties or
deprive citizens of their rights without notice and an opportunity to be

heard." 5 Coerced confessions, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, are
barred from use by the courts, 51 as is the use of testimony received
without assistance of counsel. 52 By natural extension of this doctrine,
the use in court of evidence illegally seized by private parties amounts to

state action that invades individuals' right to privacy and freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures.

While the causal relationship in a private search situation is
distinguishable from the one in a search performed by a government
144. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13.
145. See id. (setting aside possible arguments that private action could violate the
Fourth Amendment).
146. See id.
147. Id. at 14 ("[t]hat the action of state courts and of judicial officers in their
official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State... is a proposition which has
long been established by decision of this Court.").
148. See id. at 15-18 (providing numerous examples of judicial state action).
149. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
150. Brinkerhoff- Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930).
151. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
152. De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323
U.S. 485 (1945); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932).
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agent, 53 this distinction is not fatal. In Shelley, the constitutional
violation would not have occurred but for enforcement of the restrictive
covenant by the court."
In a private search situation, the privacy
violation has already begun by the time the state becomes involved
through the use of the evidence in court. 5 This distinction does not
detract entirely from the legitimacy of the analogy. Concededly, the
causal relationship between the court and the "wrong" committed is
stronger in Shelley than in the private search situation, where the nexus is
more attenuated. While the initial search may be done by a private party,
its nature is significantly worsened when a court uses the illegally seized
evidence against its owner. 156 Viewed this way, a court participates in
committing the "wrong." Thus, the variations between causal relationships

in Shelley and the private search situations are slight. 57

While there seems to be a division over what the primary policy goal
behind the exclusionary rule is, 5 ' each policy nonetheless supports
exclusion of evidence illegally seized by private parties. Although the
"'
degree of benefits depends on the nature of the search itself, 59
the
policies of both deterrence of future illegal searches and judicial integrity
153. Ziff, supra note 76, at 614.
154. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
155. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 & n.35 (1976) (asserting a
fortiori that any privacy violation resulting from a search is complete by the time the
evidence gets to court).
156. Indeed, not only is the individual's right to privacy breached, but the victim
of the search is subject to criminal liability.
157. But see Ziff, supra note 76, at 614 (arguing the causal relationship is too
attenuated for a constitutional claim in a private search scenario).
158. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (White, J., concurring); Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
159. Gates, 462 U.S. at 259 & n.14 (1983) (White, J., concurring). There are two
types of private searches: those performed by individuals and those performed by
institutions. We see the benefits of broadening the scope of the exclusionary rule to
searches performed by private institutions by way of comparison with searches performed
by private individuals. Extending the scope of the rule will not deal effectively with
private individual searches. An individual is unlikely to be aware of the exclusionary
rule and would not likely be deterred from unlawful conduct in the future. On the other
hand, the institutionalized private searcher is far more likely to be aware of the rule and
will want to comply with it to achieve its goal of apprehending criminals and securing
convictions. Because institutional private security poses the greatest threat to individual
privacy, at least some of the ends of the exclusionary rule would be met if its scope were
extended to cover unlawful private searches. See Archey, supra note 68, at 898-901;
Ziff, supra note 76, at 614-15.
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are fulfilled by extending the exclusionary rule to private searches.lw
Thus, arguments for judicial integrity support broader exclusionary

practices. The integrity of our courts is too important to be jeopardized
by a private police force acting outside the law.
D. The Public Function Doctrine

When a private entity or individual assumes and performs functions
that have been traditonally and exclusively reserved to the government,
that entity or individual becomes subject to constitutional limitations in its

relations with the public.'

While a somewhat high standard has been

set by some courts for private activity to be attributed to the state under

the public function doctrine,

62

it is clear that the doctrine has been

interpreted and applied differently in varyirg cases. 6

Nonetheless, at

the foundation of the doctrine lies the principle that "[a] state cannot avoid
its obligations under the due process clause by delegating to private
persons the authority to deprive people of their property without due
process of law."164
160. But see Ziff, supra note 76, at 614 (arguing that extending the exclusionary
rule would not promote the ends of the Fourth Amendment).
161. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (holding that a private "company"
town which assumed a wide variety of public functions became subject to constitutional
limitations under the public function doctrine); White v. Scrivner, Corp., 594 F.2d 140,
142 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that state action is present by the exercise by a private entity
of powers which are traditionally exclusively reserved to the state). See Ziff, supra note
76, at 617; Burkoff, supra note 8, at 644-58.
162. White, 594 F.2d at 142.
163. CompareShowengerdt v. General Dynamics, Corp., 823 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.
1987) (holding private security agents performing a search at a Naval installation were
state actors); Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding
that a store security guard allowed "to substitute his judgment for that of the police" was
state actor), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818 (1985); Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d
459 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding private person administering polygraph test on behalf of
police was state actor); Goichman v. Reuben Motors, Inc., 682 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir.
1982) (holding private towing company working for the police was state actor) with
Morast v. Lance, 807 F.2d 926 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding a national bank, although
regulated by federal authorities, was not a state actor when fining an employee); United
States v. Lima, 424 A.2d 113 (D.C. App. 1980) (store detective with law enforcement
goals similar to regular police not state actor); State v. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d 614 (Minn.
1990) (race track security agent not state actor); State v. Sanders, 448 A.2d 481 (N.J.
1982) (even where state required detailed casino security, guards were not state actors).
164. Del's Big Saver Foods, Inc. v. Carpenter Cook, Inc., 795 F.2d 1344, 1346
(7th Cir. 1986).
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The institutional private search" scenario is particularly ripe for
application of the public function doctrine."
Where private entities
such as private security companies are explicitly granted governmental
functions or powers, the entities "become agencies or instrumentalities of
the State and subject to its constitutional limitations." 7 Surrender by
a state of its investigatory and detention powers arguably amounts to a
delegation of traditional sovereign power, and thus, subjects the delegatee
to constitutional limitations. 6 s
Private law enforcement organizations are the groups most likely to
invade individual privacy rights because of the organizations' prevalence

in the law enforcement field,"a the organizations' special psychological

and tactical advantages over citizens, 70 and the organizations' lack of
formal training of their officers.'
Thus, application of the public
function doctrine to regulate their behavior would help safeguard
individual privacy. However, making a determination as to whether an
entity has assumed a public function necessarily involves a close and
careful examination of the individual facts of each situation." 7 Leaving
the analysis to be performed on such an ad hoc basis could lead to
inconsistent and incongruous results.1 3 Therefore, a blanket extension
of the exclusionary rule to private parties would best protect the interests
of personal privacy.

165. See supra note 162.
166. Ziff, supranote 76, at 615 ("W]nstitutionalized private searchers have a strong
enough interest in acquiring criminal convictions to be expected to change their
investigatory methods if the exclusionary rule were applied to them.").
167. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
168. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S.
416, 429 (1947) ("lilt is a common practice in this country for private watchmen or
guards to be vested with the powers of policemen, sheriffs or peace officers to protect
the private property of their private employers. And when they are performing their
police functions, they are acting as public officers and assume all the powers and
liabilities attached thereto.") See also Burkoff, supra note 8, at 644-58 (discussing the
public function doctrine).
169. See supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text. See also O'TooLE, supra note
8.
170. Burkoff, supra note 8, at 644-58 (discussing the difference between official
powers and those of an ordinary citizen, and the breadth of apparent authority that
private law enforcement officials have in relation to private citizens).
171. O'TOOLE, supra note 8, at 3-19.
172. See Burkoff, supra note 8, at 645.
173. See supra note 166.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There are social benefits and costs that also must be taken into account
before categorically extending the scope of the exclusionary rule to
unlawful private searches.174 The costs and benefits relate back to the
rule's purposes. The benefits of extending the scope of the rule are
preserving the individual interest in privacy by deterring future misconduct
and maintaining judicial integrity."u The cost of extending the rule is
to interfere with the government's interest in detecting and punishing
crime.176
Where the entities performing private searches are motivated by
securing convictions in addition to looking after their own private
interests, 77 exclusion of evidence illegally seized by them will likely
deter them from performing unlawful searches in the future.17 1 This
deterrence would benefit the interests of individual privacy, and the cost
is minimal. 79 Even conceding that there might be a minor initial
decrease in the effectiveness of law enforcement overall, this cost can be
ameliorated if agents performing searches simply would adhere to the
rules against unlawful searches."m
The same analysis also supports applying exclusionary practices to
searches by private individuals. Some may argue that the benefit of
extending the exclusionary rule to private individuals is weak in
comparison to the cost because barring the use of evidence unlawfully
seized by a private individual is not likely to make any difference in that
individual's behavior in the future."' The argument continues that
individuals are not usually aware of evidentiary rules and practices; they
will not be deterred from performing such illegal searches; therefore,
the benefits are minimal. Furthermore, private individuals regularly
provide valuable and useful information to law enforcement officials, and
if this evidence were to be barred from the courts under a blanket
174. See Archey, supra note 68, at 894-97.
175. See id.
176. Id. at 898.
177. Ziff, supra note 76, at 615. But see United States v. Garlock, 19 F.3d 441,
443 (8th Cir. 1994) (explaining that many private security organizations pursue ends
completely unrelated to obtaining criminal convictions).
178. See Ziff, supra note 76, at 615.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See Archey, supra note 68, at 898.
Id. See also Ziff, supra note 76, at 615.
Archey, supra note 68, at 898.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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exclusion, the demands of law enforcement would be seriously
impaired."
Thus, the argument concludes, the costs to effective law
enforcement are high.
However, this argument disregards the importance of privacy. A
reinvigorated view of the right to privacy consistent with its position in
our constitutional history diminishes the effectiveness of the cost/benefit
argument in connection with searches by private individuals. Deterrence
and judicial integrity aside, to the individual against whom the evidence
is being used, who searched him and seized the evidence is less important
than the fact that it is being used against him.
Remedy in tort is often hailed as a better method to deal with the
problem of illegal searches than extending exclusionary practices. 1
Some prefer it over present exclusionary practices because it compensates
the victim of the privacy invasion, rather than acting solely to deter future
misconduct by the searching party, the dominant goal of current
exclusionary practices. 1"
However, tort alone cannot fully protect
privacy rights because the issue at hand is not only compensation for the
victim.186 Exclusionary practices also implement the policy that the state
may not benefit from illegal activity and protect the courts from becoming
tainted by such illegal activities.187 Extending exclusionary practices to
private searches will serve all these interests and, perhaps in combination
with a remedy in tort, would best serve the policies of the Fourth
Amendment. Extending the rule is an appropriate reinforcement to the
civil, criminal, and administrative remedies that may also exist in many
jurisdictions. 188 For example, in the case of an unlawful private search,
application of the exclusionary rule would fully vindicate the privacy
rights of the victim by denying the use of the evidence in court. The
private searcher could then be sued in tort for trespass, charged with
criminal trespass or breaking and entering, and sanctioned (if appropriate)
by a regulatory agency of the state. However, the best remedy for the
injured party remains to have the evidence excluded from a court
183. Archey, supranote 68, at 898-99. See generally United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423, 432 (1973) (discussing the difficulties of obtaining evidence in certain cases
and acceptable remedies for this problem).
184. Archey, supra note 68, at 901.
185. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Tamm, C.J.,
dissenting).
186. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 670 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring)
("[trespass actions against officers who make unlawful searches and seizures are mainly
illusory remedies.").
187. See supra notes 126-73 and accompanying text.
188. See Archey, supra note 68, at 901.
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proceeding against him or her to prevent the deprivation of the right of
privacy.
Fear that the extension of exclusionary practices would "result in the
proscription of nonrecurrent conduct which does not present the type of
danger at which the fourth amendment was aimed," is unfounded. 89
The fears that led to the Fourth Amendment were of organized
institutions, acting under what appeared to be the authority of the state
arbitrarily invading a citizen's right to personal privacy. This is just what
will occur as the private security industry continues its remarkable growth.
In the end, four arguments support extending the scope of the
exclusionary rule to bar the use in court of evidence seized unlawfully by
private institutional parties in court. The history and spirit of the Fourth
Amendment provide the necessary principles. 1" Precedent provides a
legal foundation.191
The doctrine of judicial integrity and the public
function doctrine provide legal justifications. 1 - With these reasons for
extending the exclusionary rule, the interests of justice will be better
served and the interests at hand effectively balanced. In the end,
individual privacy will be better secured in our modern society where such
security is becoming more and more difficult to ensure.
Marco Caffizzi

189. Ziff, supra note 76, at 614.
190. See supra notes 87-106 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 107-25 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 126-73 and accompanying text.

